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17 
18 
19 When EU and US officials launched negotiations of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
20 
21 
Partnership (TTIP) in February 2013, few had anticipated that it would become the most 
23 
24 controversial trade deal in decades. More than 3.2 million people had signed the European 
25 
26 Citizens Initiative (ECI) against TTIP and tens of thousands took to the streets to show their 
27 
28 
disapproval, mobilised by a transnational coalition of civil society organisations (CSO). The 
30 
31 extent of opposition varied markedly between member states but Eurobarometer polls showed 
32 
33 that support for TTIP ‘declined EU-wide over the period of the talks from a net approval of 33 
34 
35 
percentage points in November 2014 to 19 percentage points two years later’ (Siles-Brügge, 
36 
37 
38 2017: 474). While Donald Trump’s election may have put the final nail in TTIP’s coffin in late 
39 
40 2016, the prospect of an EU-US trade deal continues to animate the political dreams of officials 
41 
42 on both sides of the Atlantic. Writing for Politico magazine, the former US ambassador, 
43 
44 
Anthony Gardner (2017), urged policy-makers to learn from their failure and to 
46 
47 
48 treat TTIP like a political campaign…we should call on communications professionals 
49 
50 and use focus groups to better understand what messages connect with the 
51 
52 
53 public…[and] to combat active disinformation campaigns organized by NGOs to play 
54 
55 up people’s fear for financial gain. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
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1 
2 
3 Gardner’s call to arms captures the ‘unprecedented politicisation’ (De Ville & Gheyle 2019: 
4 
5 
20) surrounding TTIP–a case that has attracted interest mainly from political scientists (De 
7 
8 Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016; Eliasson & Garcia-Duran, 2018; Siles-Brügge, 2017; Meunier & 
9 
10 Czesana, 2019). A key area of research has been the conflict over transparency (Coremans, 
11 
12 
2017; Heldt, 2019). Heralded by EU officials as the most transparent trade negotiations ever, 
14 
15 anti-TTIP campaigners consistently claimed that the European Commission’s (EC) secrecy 
16 
17 undermined the ability of the public to participate meaningfully in shaping the agreement. As 
18 
19 
Gheyle & De Ville (2017) demonstrate, the conflict over transparency reflects a more 
20 
21 
22 fundamental conflict over competing conceptions of legitimacy which accord very different 
23 
24 roles to citizens and CSOs in EU governance–questions that lie at the heart of this paper. 
25 
26 The anti-TTIP campaign is but the latest chapter in the genealogy of protest movements 
27 
28 
to challenge the EU’s role in international trade politics: from the Battle of Seattle in 1999, the 
30 
31 2012 pan-European wave of mobilisation that brought down the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
32 
33 Agreement (ACTA) (Dür & Mateo, 2014), to issue-specific campaigns focused on EU trade 
34 
35 
policies regarding access to medicines (Stavinoha, 2016). In the case of TTIP, campaigners’ 
37 
38 ‘highly emotive “injustice frame”’ (Siles-Brügge 2017: 481), which resonated across digital 
39 
40 (von Nordheim et al., 2018) and mainstream news media (Boukes, 2019; Conrad & Oleart, 
41 
42 
2020), succeeded in ‘evoking a crisis consciousness at the periphery’ of European public 
43 
44 
45 spheres (Habermas, 1996:382). No longer confined to the insular world of technocratic policy- 
46 
47 making, the EC, which negotiates trade agreements on behalf of EU member states subject to 
48 
49 approval by the European Parliament (EP) and national governments, was compelled ‘to 
50 
51 
actively defend trade negotiations…in the greater public realm’ (Garcia-Duran & Eliasson 
53 
54 2017: 492). And it is the Commission’s information policy response to the contestation over 
55 
56 TTIP that is the focus of this article. 
57 
58 
59 
60 
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1 
2 
3 This article contributes to existing literature by, first, offering novel insights into the 
4 
5 
communicative dimension of EU trade politicisation and, second, by situating the analysis of 
7 
8 the  Commission’s  information  policy  within  long-standing  debates  about  the  ‘elusive’ 
9 
10 European  Public  Sphere  (EPS)  (Heinderyckx,  2015).  For  although  mass-mediated public 
11 
12 
spheres have emerged as key sites of contestation over the legitimacy of the global trade 
14 
15 regime, TTIP, and EU trade politics more generally, have attracted relatively little attention 
16 
17 from media and communication scholars. Defined as ‘a set of political decisions, which 
18 
19 determine…an organisation’s communication with…the general public’ and encompass both 
20 
21 
22 ‘active communication (public relations)’ and ‘regulations of access to information 
23 
24 (transparency regime)’ (Brüggemann, 2010: 7), the aim is not to evaluate the information 
25 
26 policy in narrow instrumental terms of effectiveness. Instead, through the lens of political 
27 
28 
sociology (Zimmerman & Favell, 2011), I seek to problematize normative assumptions in EPS 
30 
31 literature that reduce the EU’s legitimation crisis to a ‘communication deficit’, which, I argue, 
32 
33 risks emptying public sphere theory of its critical edge. I do so by exploring the ideas about 
34 
35 
public opinion that inform the Commission’s communication strategy: How is ‘public opinion’ 
37 
38 constructed, invoked, or excluded within institutional discourses? What ‘lay theories’ of 
39 
40 democracy and the EPS (Herbst, 1998) does this reveal? 
41 
42 
I approach these questions by analysing previously unavailable EC documents obtained 
43 
44 
45 through Freedom of Information (FOI) requests. A rarely used method of data-gathering, FOIs 
46 
47 offer researchers ‘a unique means of studying official management and public relations 
48 
49 activities’ (Walby & Larsen: 2012: 31-32) by granting access to confidential areas of elite 
50 
51 
discourse. Consequently, this allows for empirical analysis to move beyond an exclusive focus 
53 
54 on the Commission’s official discourse characteristic of existing research (Garcia-Duran & 
55 
56 Eliasson, 2017; Siles-Brügge 2017). The analysis of internal deliberation reveals a predominant 
57 
58 
‘antipublic’ discourse (Kantola, 2001), where civil society mobilisation needs to be carefully 
60 
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2 
3 monitored and contained; a problem to be solved through strategic public relations (PR). This, 
4 
5 
I argue, is reflective of the historically engrained institutional ambivalence towards public- 
7 
8 political participation in EU affairs–a tension between seeing citizens as both ‘an object of 
9 
10 manipulation and an independent source of legitimacy’ (Sternberg, 2016: 47)-as well as the 
11 
12 
decay of ‘representative structures and processes’ at both national and EU levels that 
14 
15 characterizes the current ‘post-democratic’ condition (Fenton & Titley, 2015). 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 The Politics of TTIP 
21 
22 
23 The aim here is not to evaluate claims about the deal’s economic costs and benefits (De Ville 
24 
25 & Siles-Brügge, 2016), explain its unprecedented public salience (Meunier & Czesana, 2019), 
26 
27 
nor to chart the emergence of the anti-TTIP coalition and its impact on trade policy (Eliasson 
29 
30 & Garcia-Duran, 2018). Crucial for our discussion, however, is Crouch’s (2014) argument that 
31 
32 in both substantive and procedural terms TTIP constitutes a quintessentially post-democratic 
33 
34 
project. Post-democracy is characterised by the shift of politics away from mass-mediated 
36 
37 public spheres to unaccountable arenas colonised by corporate lobby groups, leaving citizens 
38 
39 with only the hollow shell of liberal democracy filled by mediatised spectacles (Crouch, 2004). 
40 
41 
Under post-democratic conditions, Fenton and Titley contend, public ‘deliberation has little or 
43 
44 no impact on the “political administrative complex”’ at national or transnational levels of 
45 
46 governance (2015: 559). Under the guise of reducing non-tariff trade barriers, critics argued 
47 
48 the deal would impose a ‘regulatory chill’ on governments’ abilities to enact consumer, 
49 
50 
welfare, or environmental measures in the public interest (De Ville & Siles-Brügge, 2016). In 
52 
53 this regard, the proposed Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) clause emerged as the most 
54 
55 contentious provision of TTIP, echoing mass public opposition to similar provisions in the 
56 
57 Multilateral Agreement on Investment that was being negotiated in secret by OECD members 
59 
60 in the late 1990s. A cornerstone of the global investment regime, ISDS allows foreign investors 
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3 to sue host states via opaque international arbitration courts if they deem their investment rights 
4 
5 
are  being  violated  by  regulatory  or  legislative  measures.  By  expanding  the  rights  of 
7 
8 transnational corporations (TNCs) while operating outside the bounds of democratic modes of 
9 
10 accountability, ISDS constitutes, in Crouch’s (2014) words, ‘post-democracy in its purest 
11 
12 
form.’ 
14 
15 This relates to the second – procedural – critique of TTIP: lack of transparency. 
16 
17 Throughout the negotiations, the Commission had been accused of marginalising input from 
18 
19 
civil society by withholding access to key documents, including the negotiation mandate, under 
20 
21 
22 the guise of ‘confidentiality’, while simultaneously granting privileged access to corporate 
23 
24 lobbyists (Coremans, 2017). In response, and especially once Cecilia Malmström had taken 
25 
26 over as EU Trade Commissioner from Karel de Gucht in November 2014, the Commission 
27 
28 
implemented several transparency measures, including wider consultations with CSOs and the 
30 
31 European Parliament, and disclosing a range of hitherto confidential documents. Transparency 
32 
33 thus became integral to the Commission’s legitimation strategy. However, far from appeasing 
34 
35 
its critics, this only had the ‘paradoxical’ effect of further politicising the negotiations (Heldt, 
37 
38 2019). 
39 
40 Gheyle and De Ville (2017: 24) push the argument further by locating this paradox in 
41 
42 
the underlying conflict between the EC (and, importantly, corporate lobby groups) and CSOs 
43 
44 
45 over ‘the requirements for legitimate trade negotiations.’ Distinguishing between a ‘delegation’ 
46 
47 and ‘participation’ model of institutional accountability, they conclude that 
48 
49 
50 
51 
for the EC, transparency is primarily aimed at fostering citizens’ trust by allowing them 
53 
54 to understand what is being negotiated. For CSOs, transparency is just a stepping-stone 
55 
56 that should allow citizens (through CSOs) to meaningfully participate in the 
57 
58 
negotiations, and only this can bring about trust. (23-24) 
60 
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4 
5 
Consequently, the political contestation over TTIP is much more than a contest over its 
7 
8 distributive consequences but a conflict between fundamentally irreconcilable conceptions of 
9 
10 legitimation  where  the  ‘public’  is  seen  either  as  a  passive  object  of  strategic  political 
11 
12 
communication or an active subject of political decision-making. This conflict, I argue, reflects 
14 
15 a much more deep-rooted institutional ambivalence towards the role of citizens in EU affairs 
16 
17 and the formation of a European Public Sphere to which we now turn. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 Losing the critical edge 
23 
24 Amongst theorists of the EPS, the notion of a ‘communication deficit’ has become central to 
25 
26 attempts to explain the apparent disconnect between EU policy elites and public opinion, with 
27 
28 
a dual preoccupation, as Pérez (2013: 7) explains, ‘with the design of institutional public 
30 
31 relations’ and ‘the role of the news media in reporting EU policies.’ Concerning the former, 
32 
33 research has evaluated whether the Commission’s information policies have contributed to an 
34 
35 
EPS ‘through enhancing the transparency of European governance’ and fostering political 
37 
38 ‘dialogue with the citizens’ (Brüggemann, 2010; Thiel, 2008; Van Brussel, 2014). Regarding 
39 
40 the latter, communication scholars have assessed in how far EU-related national, transnational 
41 
42 
or digital media discourses contribute to the ‘Europeanization’ of political communication, 
43 
44 
45 creating a shared space for pan-European public-political debate (Bärenreuter et al., 2009; 
46 
47 Desmet et al., 2015; Heinderyckx, 2015; Hänska & Bauchowitz, 2019)-a voluminous body 
48 
49 literature that has done much to advance our understanding of ‘how the EU is publicly 
50 
51 
discussed, contested and discursively constructed in the media’ (Zimmermann & Favell, 2011: 
53 
54 505). The aim here is not to offer another comprehensive review but rather to highlight a series 
55 
56 of normative assumptions that inhibit a more radical critique of the Commission’s information 
57 
58 
policy. 
60 
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1 
2 
3 The first point to emphasise, following Baisnee’s perceptive reading of the debate, is 
4 
5 
that ‘most of the research designs have been the “victims” of a definition of the European public 
7 
8 sphere that  is  directly  inspired  by  the EU’  (2007: 495).  Indeed,  the  view  that  the   EU’s 
9 
10 legitimation crisis is driven by the ‘insufficient and ineffective provision of information, as 
11 
12 
well as a lack of transparent policy-making processes’ (Thiel, 2008: 343) chimes neatly with 
14 
15 long-running institutional efforts to manufacture consent for the European project (Sternberg, 
16 
17 2016). For example, the EC (2018) continually affirms its commitment ‘to ensuring trade 
18 
19 
policy is transparent and inclusive in order to enhance legitimacy and public trust.’ Yet, as 
20 
21 
22 Pérez (2013: 6-8) argues, conceptualising the EU’s proverbial ‘democratic deficit’ as 
23 
24 fundamentally a problem of communication masks its root causes which may not lie ‘in 
25 
26 communication but mainly the sort of political regime the EU is’–namely one governed by the 
27 
28 
technocratic and corporatist logics that ‘are biased against the development of a European 
30 
31 public sphere.’ 
32 
33 Second, conspicuously absent from investigation are what Habermas calls the 
34 
35 
‘pathologies of political communication’ (2006:420) that widen the gap between the ideal- 
37 
38 typical function of public spheres and their factual deformation. This follows from the 
39 
40 prevalence of a positivist media-centric operationalisation rooted in a ‘weak’ (Splichal, 2006) 
41 
42 
concept of the public sphere. In de Vreese’s ‘realistic’ approach, for example, ‘Europeanised 
43 
44 
45 national public spheres’ are reduced to ‘observations of parallelization and synchrony in topics 
46 
47 and an increase in salience of European issues and actors’ across national public spheres (2007: 
48 
49 11). In another widely-cited review, the public sphere is defined in rather nebulous terms as 
50 
51 
‘an intersubjectively shared, communicatively constructed system of mutual observance’ 
53 
54 (Bärenreuter et al., 2009: 9). While clearly not exhaustive of the definitional debate, these 
55 
56 examples are emblematic of the tendency to present public spheres as free-floating 
57 
58 
communicative spaces, abstracted from the colonisation of public-political deliberation by state 
60 
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3 and corporate actors under conditions of neoliberal hegemony (Kantola, 2001; Fenton & Titley, 
4 
5 
2015). 
7 
8 Consequently, commitment to the emancipatory claims of critical theory ‘has been 
9 
10 sacrificed  for  the  sake  of  empirical  clarity  and  engagement  with  mainstream questions’ 
11 
12 
(Zimmermann & Favell, 2011: 506). Rather than a yardstick for interrogating how existing 
14 
15 modes of political communication undermine the realisation of ‘the radical content of 
16 
17 democratic ideals’ (Flynn, 2004: 451), the ‘public sphere’ is deployed as part of scholarship 
18 
19 
that is normatively oriented towards maintaining the existing political order. Hence the 
20 
21 
22 concern is with how ‘the EU’s institutions…[can] supply more effective, i.e. accessible, and 
23 
24 politically legitimizing information’ (Thiel, 2008: 343) for, as Anderson and Price suggest, the 
25 
26 ‘Commission’s task…is to help construct future social “realities” in its favour’ (2008: 43-44). 
27 
28 
In a recent intervention, Heinderyckx (2015:3162) begins his review of the role of 
30 
31 cross-border news media in the construction of an EPS with the claim that ‘the leadership of 
32 
33 the European construction has clearly identified the need to create…a space where citizens of 
34 
35 
the Union can exchange, debate, engage, agree, disagree, and mobilize.’ Such a reading, 
37 
38 however, glosses over how EU institutions have historically played an active role in minimising 
39 
40 publicity–the central principle of public sphere theory (Splichal, 2006). Stenberg’s (2016) 
41 
42 
insightful survey of the EU’s shifting discourses of legitimacy traces this ambivalence to the 
43 
44 
45 very origins of the integration project. Her work shows that the EU’s political leadership has 
46 
47 since the 1950s framed ‘public opinion as a “problem”...in need of being “won over” but also, 
48 
49 importantly, of being guided and contained’ (32). Morphing into an expanding institutional 
50 
51 
apparatus such as the Eurobarometer poll, EU institutions have over time given ‘increasing 
53 
54 space and recognition to sceptical and increasingly polarised public opinion...Yet, it also saw 
55 
56 them trying essentially to limit the impact, or obstructive potential, on the actual course of EU 
57 
58 
policies’ (47-48). 
60 
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2 
3 Sternberg’s  argument  is  supported  by  European  integration  scholars  who  have 
4 
5 
examined the Commission’s governance reforms in response to demands for more active 
7 
8 citizen participation since the turn of the millennium. The implementation of civil society 
9 
10 ‘dialogues’ and other deliberative and transparency measures, Tsakatika claims (2005: 210), 
11 
12 
did not however mark a significant shift from the prevailing technocratic, output-oriented 
14 
15 conception of legitimation: 
16 
17 
18 
19 
The possibility that once citizens ‘understand’ they might still not be willing to grant 
20 
21 
22 legitimacy to the Union, is not even contemplated…In other words, the fact that citizens 
23 
24 are mentioned does not mean that citizens are meant to be empowered. 
25 
26 
27 
28 
To be sure, EU institutions have more recently created novel mechanisms to facilitate citizens’ 
30 
31 political participation, most ambitiously through the ECI (Conrad & Oleart, 2020), while the 
32 
33 Commission’s information policy has moved beyond traditional ‘one-way process of informing 
34 
35 
and justifying EU policy output’ (Van Brussel, 2014:93). Confined to areas of ‘non-decision’ 
37 
38 (Magnette, 2003), such efforts nonetheless maintain an ‘artificial top-down model of the public 
39 
40 sphere’ whose ultimate aim is to depoliticise EU governance (Bee, 2014: 1021). 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 In sum, institutional ambivalence towards democratic participation at the EU level reflects the 
46 
47 contradictions of a political regime that places a discursive emphasis on dialogic engagement 
48 
49 with citizens but is governed by ‘elitist’ (Magnette, 2003) conceptions of democracy designed 
50 
51 
to insulate political power from public involvement. A key aim of this paper is to reveal how 
53 
54 this ambivalence is encoded in the Commission’s TTIP information policy. 
55 
56 Returning to the concept of post-democracy, Fenton and Titley (2015) argue that we 
57 
58 
need to situate the intensification of these contradictions against the material forces unleashed 
60 
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3 by neoliberal governmentality in recent decades. The hollowing out of democratic processes at 
4 
5 
the EU level is thus closely bound up with the pathologies of inequality and concentrations of 
7 
8 power  that  afflict  contemporary  liberal  democracies,  resulting  in  the  ‘reduced  political 
9 
10 influence and democratic agency’ of citizens in relation to national and transnational sites of 
11 
12 
political decision-making (ibid: 559). Whether the advance of post-democracy has rendered 
14 
15 void textbook assumptions about liberal democracy and fatally weakened the critical- 
16 
17 normative potency of public sphere theory, as Fenton and Titley (2015) contend, is a point to 
18 
19 
which I return below. But their critique foregrounds the question, often bracketed out from the 
20 
21 
22 EPS debate, of what Fraser (2007) calls the ‘political efficacy of public opinion’- whether 
23 
24 communicative power generated in public spheres actually translates into political power. For 
25 
26 instance, while Brüggemann finds that the Commission’s institutionalised ‘dialogues’ with 
27 
28 
citizens are decoupled from political decision-making, the question whether ‘EU politics can 
30 
31 be expected to be responsive to public opinions’ is placed on the margins of theorisation (2010: 
32 
33 8). This elision sustains the view that ineffective information policy rather than the neoliberal 
34 
35 
capture of democracy lie at the root of the EU’s legitimation crisis. 
37 
38 The notion of post-democracy also carries important methodological implications. It 
39 
40 implies moving empirical analysis beyond the level of public-facing discourse, which leaves 
41 
42 
us with unsatisfactory claims that the Commission continually fails to meet its own 
43 
44 
45 ‘democratically acceptable aims’ of fostering political dialogue with citizens due to 
46 
47 bureaucratic obstinacy, insufficient resources, and ‘a lack of effective implementation’ 
48 
49 (Brüggemann, 2010: 18-19). Instead, once we open up the black box of internal deliberation, 
50 
51 
we can begin to trace the deep-seated distrust amongst political and bureaucratic elites towards 
53 
54 the public sphere, as in Kantola’s (2001:67) investigation of the ‘discursive world’ of Finnish 
55 
56 elites, which documents the proliferation of ‘antipublic ideologies’ that ‘aim at…eliminating 
57 
58 
59 
60 
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3 public political discussion’ from decision-making at both national and EU levels on the grounds 
4 
5 
that ‘it is irrelevant, irrational or ignorant.’ 
7 
8 Rather than elite interviewing, however, I draw on internal Commission documents 
9 
10 obtained through FOI requests, as detailed next. 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 Methods 
16 
17 FOIs offer researchers an opportunity to ‘go beyond the study of cautiously prepared public 
18 
19 
relations texts and official discourse’ (Walby & Larsen, 2012: 39) by gaining access to a range 
20 
21 
22 of ‘texts produced as parts of governing’ (ibid: 33)–internal emails, memos, working 
23 
24 documents, etc. For communication scholars, targeting an institution’s PR strategies through 
25 
26 FOIs can be particularly insightful for probing ‘how organizations manage information and 
27 
28 
their public image’ (ibid: 38). However, FOIs have their own limitations. Besides legal 
30 
31 exemptions, bureaucracies often interpret requests in narrow terms to exclude certain 
32 
33 documents from their scope.1 Furthermore, Lee (2005: 9) cautions, ‘what is most secret is not 
34 
35 
necessarily what is most significant’, in part because disclosed documents may contain ‘a fairly 
37 
38 high level of dross’ (6). Yet, careful sifting, as I hope to demonstrate below, can provide 
39 
40 important insights into institutional deliberation that is meant to be kept from the public eye. 
41 
42 
Two sets of FOI requests were filed targeting all documents pertaining to the TTIP 
43 
44 
45 communications strategy held by the Commission’s Directorate-General (DG) Trade for the 
46 
47 period January 2013–December 2014 and January 2015–May 2016. Following the 
48 
49 Commission’s initial response, several appeals (‘confirmatory applications’) were submitted 
50 
51 
in a (partially successful) attempt to gain wider access. All in all, 112 documents were 
53 
54 disclosed. After manually eliminating mundane documents (e.g. emails concerning 
55 
56 organisational aspects of meetings), the remaining documents were thematically sorted into 
57 
58 
59    
60 1 EU access to documents requests are governed by Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001. 
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1 
2 
3 three main categories: 1) minutes of TTIP Communication Strategy Coordination Meetings; 2) 
4 
5 
strategic memos and internal analyses; 3) internal media monitoring reports. The analysis of 
7 
8 these documents was guided by Herbst’s (1989) social-constructivist approach to studying 
9 
10 public opinion to explore policy-makers’ ‘lay theories’ of democracy and models of the public 
11 
12 
sphere. Rather than reconstructing the ensemble of practices that make up the Commission’s 
14 
15 TTIP information policy or analysing official discourse, this approach directs concerns towards 
16 
17 identifying what conceptions and ideas about public opinion are embedded in everyday 
18 
19 
institutional talk. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 Selling TTIP 
26 
27 Since the early stages of negotiations, Commission officials were fully aware of the 
28 
29 unprecedented politicisation of TTIP. In a leaked strategic memo, the Commission cautioned 
30 
31 
member states that ‘strong political communication will be essential to the success of [TTIP]’ 
33 
34 given that ‘[n]o other negotiation has been subject to a similar level of public scrutiny.’2 An 
35 
36 August 2013 ‘Communication & Outreach Strategy Contribution’ prepared for the College of 
37 
38 
Commissioners warned: ‘With so much interest…from the European Parliament, civil society 
40 
41 and the media, the political dynamics are unpredictable. The biggest risk is of a repeat of the 
42 
43 scenario that led to the rejection of [ACTA]’ just months earlier following mass civil society 
44 
45 mobilisation. Thus, from the onset, the politicisation of TTIP was framed as a threat to be 
46 
47 
48 closely monitored. 
49 
50 To pre-empt the ACTA scenario from materialising, the Commission informed member 
51 
52 states’ representatives that it had developed a ‘holistic’ strategy ‘uniting media relations, 
53 
54 
outreach and management of stakeholders, social media and transparency.’ The strategy was 
56 
57 based on three pillars: (1) ‘pedagogical’ aim to ‘shape perceptions’ and raise public awareness 
58 
59    
60 2 Unless specified, the sources of all quotations from internal documents are listed in the Appendix. 
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1 
2 
3 of the ‘benefits’ of TTIP; (2) ‘localising’ communication through coordination with member 
4 
5 
states to ‘influence…national debates…as opposed to…engaging inside the Brussels bubble’; 
7 
8 (3) ‘de-institutionalising’ messaging through ‘third-party endorsement’ as these ‘have a greater 
9 
10 impact on public opinion than messages directly from the Commission’ which faces a problem 
11 
12 
of ‘trust’ and ‘credibility’. 
14 
15 Other documents reveal the extent of the Commission’s ‘operation…led by a Head of 
16 
17 Communications in DG Trade with the strong support of DG Communications and the 
18 
19 [Spokespersons Service]’: disseminating positions papers, factsheets, explanatory documents, 
20 
21 
22 press material, organising media briefings, a revamped website, as well as a ‘dedicated TTIP 
23 
24 Twitter account’. The aim was to produce ‘targeted communications material and deploying 
25 
26 that material through all channels including online and social media.’ Departing from the ‘long- 
27 
28 
standing tradition of not communicating with the broader public’ (Brüggemann, 2010: 6), the 
30 
31 Commission emphasised the importance of ‘communicating directly with members of the 
32 
33 public’ and intervening in ‘key markets’ - identified variously as Germany, France, Poland, 
34 
35 
and the UK. For this purpose, it deployed its ‘monitoring capacity’ and ‘tools for traditional 
37 
38 and social media, as well as public opinion’ analysis. A ‘special brief on TTIP’ delivered every 
39 
40 3-4 months by DG COMM provided officials with a comprehensive overview of political 
41 
42 
contestation over TTIP in individual MS. Importantly, transparency and engagement with 
43 
44 
45 CSOs were also incorporated as integral elements of the PR campaign. The Civil Society 
46 
47 Dialogue (CSD)–the Commission’s main platform for exchanging views with CSOs–was 
48 
49 listed, alongside photo-ops and press conferences, as part of the ‘communication logistics 
50 
51 
around the second round’ of negotiations. 
53 
54 However, despite considerable resources devoted to ‘selling TTIP’ (Siles-Brügge & De 
55 
56 Ville, 2016), the Commission’s efforts to set the terms of public debate and frame TTIP as ‘a 
57 
58 
means of preserving EU values and democracy’ (Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, 2017: 503) largely 
60 
European Journal of Communication Page 14 of 29 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/EJC 
 
 
6 
13 
29 
36 
52 
1 
2 
3 failed, as anti-TTIP opponents gained control of media frames online and offline (Conrad & 
4 
5 
Oleart, 2020).3 Indeed, Commission officials were acutely aware of growing negative publicity 
7 
8 surrounding TTIP. In early 2014, monitoring reports of French press coverage, for example, 
9 
10 identified ‘negative reporting [which] criticized [TTIP’s] excessive neoliberal stance’ and cited 
11 
12 
trade union and NGO critiques ‘regarding the potential threat to democracy.’ In May, the report 
14 
15 noted that ‘social media discussions on TTIP are almost entirely dominated by 
16 
17 opponents…both in terms of reach and output.’ A September 2014 ‘Note to the Commissioner- 
18 
19 Designate’ Malmström began by highlighting that ‘The domestic political challenge on TTIP 
20 
21 
22 is the most serious faced by any EU trade negotiation since the 1990s’ with ‘large-scale 
23 
24 mobilisation by campaigners against the agreement’ in several countries. Three months later, 
25 
26 the Commission ‘presented the state of public debate’ in a meeting with the Trade Policy 
27 
28 
Committee of the Council: ‘more than 5000 [news] articles…as well as 60000 mentions of 
30 
31 TTIP in social media…one of the top 20 mentioned terms on same days’, with concerns about 
32 
33 ‘maintenance of public services’, ISDS, and obstacles to ‘the involvement of citizens’ as cross- 
34 
35 
cutting themes. 
37 
38 Such intense levels of mass-mediated debate and the infiltration of citizens’ 
39 
40 communicative power into sites of institutional decision-making could be read, in line with 
41 
42 
normative theories of deliberative democracy, as signs of a vibrant Europeanised public sphere 
43 
44 
45 (Flynn, 2004). Yet, the fact that public-political engagement with ‘TTIP goes far beyond social 
46 
47 media and NGO circles: not an “elite” discussion, but a “Sunday family dinner issue”’ is instead 
48 
49 framed as a problem to be managed through more effective PR. An internal ‘note’ circulated 
50 
51 
in February 2015 cited the threat of anti-TTIP sentiments feeding into electoral processes in ‘a 
53 
54 handful of EU countries’ as additional rationale for ‘a TTIP advocacy campaign on benefits for 
55 
56 
57 
58    
59 3 In 2015, DG Trade ‘earmarked 1.5 million Euro for an integrated information campaign on (the benefits of) 
60 
EU trade policy with a specific focus on TTIP.’ 
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1 
2 
3 SMEs and “trade and jobs”’ targeting ‘the widest possible audience.’ It cautioned that ‘if being 
4 
5 
“anti-TTIP” becomes politically fashionable it will be more difficult to reverse the trend and 
7 
8 the general attitude towards trade policy may also become more negative.’ 
9 
10 Further evidence of such ‘antipublic’ and ‘antipolitical’ (Kantola, 2001) attitudes 
11 
12 
emerges from the dominant explanatory framework regarding public opposition to TTIP. For 
14 
15 example, a heavily redacted ‘note’ prepared for de Gucht’s Head of Cabinet in February 2014 
16 
17 made the following assessment: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 We have moved from a situation with no awareness and, hence no prejudice, to a 
23 
24 situation with significant awareness of the existence of the TTIP project and increasing 
25 
26 negative prejudice against it. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 Elsewhere, officials lamented the ‘emotional character of the debate’ and identified ‘the anti- 
32 
33 globalisation feeling, latent animosity towards the US and an increasing EU scepticism’ as 
34 
35 
‘underlying issues’. From the onset, ‘[a]nxiety around the potential impact on the European 
37 
38 social model’ was defined as ‘the primary…communications challenge’ - particularly the ‘risk 
39 
40 that this view becomes mainstream either in the [EP] or among national electorates. This is the 
41 
42 
process that happened with ACTA and what must be avoided at all costs.’ In response, the 
43 
44 
45 Commission suggested that ‘the process’ of negotiating TTIP ‘needs to be transparent enough 
46 
47 to reduce fears and avoid a mushrooming of doubt’ among European citizens. 
48 
49 
50 
51 
A clear pattern emerges from these internal exchanges: a pervasive belief in the irrationality 
53 
54 and ignorance of mass publics. There is, as one email noted, ‘huge interest, but little 
55 
56 understanding.’ Manipulated by activists who use ‘emotional arguments’, attitudes are based 
57 
58 
largely on ‘perceptions [and] myths.’ Whether there is an element of truth to this assessment, 
60 
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1 
2 
3 given some of the hyperbolic claims by anti-TTIP activists, is a moot point. The key argument 
4 
5 
here is that the Commission was able to justify its ‘strategic interventions in the public sphere’ 
7 
8 (Brüggemann, 2010: 9) by positioning itself as the technocratic repository of reason on one 
9 
10 hand and citizens as a misguided ‘audience that needs to be convinced’ with ‘killer examples 
11 
12 
and figures’ and ‘myth-busting documents’ on the other. 
14 
15 
16 
17 The spectre of public opinion 
18 
19 
It is in this discursive context that the spectre of public opinion in the form of polls, protests, 
20 
21 
22 and petitions was invoked in internal deliberation. While publicly Malmström had pledged in 
23 
24 mid-2015 ‘“to put transparency and public discussion about all issues and citizens” concerns 
25 
26 at the centre of trade policy’ (in Garcia-Duran & Eliasson, 2017: 501), signs of mobilisation 
27 
28 
outside the confines of official deliberative platforms like the CSD were seen as a threat to the 
30 
31 ‘successful’ outcome of negotiations. The language used in the disclosed documents is 
32 
33 instructive. Consider this reference in the minutes of a July 2013 meeting to a leading digital 
34 
35 
advocacy NGO: ‘Avaaz: need to monitor to avoid even a ripple, let alone a wave of anti-TTIP 
37 
38 (they had 2 million signatures against ACTA).’ A year later, the CSOs that sponsored the ‘Stop 
39 
40 TTIP’ ECI–the EU’s flagship ‘instrument of transnational deliberative democracy’ (Conrad & 
41 
42 
Oleart, 2020: 531)–signed by more than three million citizens were labelled as ‘opponents’.4 
43 
44 
45 Though explicit references to polling data were rare in internal exchanges, DG COMM 
46 
47 did incorporate a question on TTIP into its regular Eurobarometer survey. Prior to the second 
48 
49 negotiating round in September 2013, DG COMM notified trade officials about 
50 
51 
‘Eurobarometer data which may be judged useful to release’ as the results indicated that 58% 
53 
54 
55 
56 
4 Revealingly, the Commission refused to register the ‘Stop TTIP’ ECI in September 2014 inter alia on legalistic 
57 grounds that the ‘proposal is outside the framework of its powers.’ In May 2017, the European Court of Justice 
58 annulled the Commission’s decision, ruling that the petition ‘does not constitute an inadmissible interference in the legislative procedure’, as the Commission had claimed, ‘but the legitimate initiation of a democratic debate.’ 
60 
See: https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2017-05/cp170049en.pdf 
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2 
3 of Europeans support an EU-US ‘free trade’ agreement. Importantly, public opinion in this 
4 
5 
context appears not as a communicatively-generated ‘political force’ that should ‘hold officials 
7 
8 accountable’ and ensure that decision-making ‘express the will of the citizenry’ (Fraser, 2007: 
9 
10 7).  Instead,  according  to  an  internal  document,  the  challenge  facing  the  Commission is 
11 
12 
‘understanding and adapting messages to opinion (polls, surveys, data)’. Public opinion thus 
14 
15 constitutes an instrument for calibrating the Commission’s information policy and, if 
16 
17 favourable, to be selectively invoked, as in Habermas’ (1991) refeudalised public spheres, as a 
18 
19 source of ‘acclamation’ for a pre-determined policy agenda. 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 Between transparency and technocracy 
25 
26 What emerges from this close reading of ‘backstage texts’ (Walby & Larsen, 2012: 34) is an 
27 
28 
information policy underpinned by a Schumpeterian, elitist conception of democracy (Held, 
30 
31 2006), which accords only a minimal role to citizens and civil society in setting the EU’s trade 
32 
33 agenda. The analysis is inevitably partial, based on an incomplete record, as many documents 
34 
35 
were redacted or withheld entirely. In the context of allegedly the most transparent trade 
37 
38 negotiations, this includes, in a particular grotesque irony, withholding access to internal 
39 
40 discussions about transparency (see Figure 1). 
41 
42 
43 
44 
45 
46 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
European Journal of Communication Page 18 of 29 
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/EJC 
 
 
For 
Peer 
44 
51 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Figure 1: European Commission document partially disclosed through FOI request 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 Nonetheless, the justifications for non-disclosure offer additional insights into the transparency 
38 
39 regime. The Commission claims that ‘public release of this information’ may not only limit the 
40 
41 ‘margins of manoeuvre’ of negotiators but may have ‘negative repercussions on…public 
42 
43 
opinion.’ In line with the delegation model of institutional transparency (Gheyle & de Ville, 
45 
46 2017), documents pertaining to ‘controversial communication issues’ that could ‘endanger the 
47 
48 TTIP negotiations’ thus need to be withheld, as it is ‘necessary to protect the “space to think” 
49 
50 
of officials.’ In another ironic twist, then, the ‘public interest’, the Commission concludes, is 
52 
53 ‘better served’ when officials are able ‘to complete the decision-making in question without 
54 
55 any external pressure’–that is, without the obstructive involvement of the public. The 
56 
57 
institutional imperative is clear: ‘technocratic efficiency retains primacy over democracy’ 
58 
59 
60 (Tsakatika, 2005: 214). Whether these justifications are in accordance with established EU case 
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1 
2 
3 law  (as  the  Commissions  claims)  matters  less  here  than  the  underlying  ideas  about the 
4 
5 
democratic function of the public sphere that such imposed limits on the transparency regime 
7 
8 reveal. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
Conclusion 
14 
15 Through the case study of TTIP, this article has made a three-fold intervention in existing 
16 
17 debates about the EC’s information policy. First, by analysing internal deliberation rather than 
18 
19 
official discourse, it offers novel insights into policymakers’ operative models of the public 
20 
21 
22 sphere, where the public is viewed as something to be managed and cajoled through persuasive 
23 
24 communication. Second, in doing so, it has demonstrated the potential of FOI requests as a 
25 
26 data-gathering method for probing areas of elite discourse. The argument here is not that this 
27 
28 
is a means to accessing some putatively deeper layer of institutional ‘truths’. Nor is it about 
30 
31 intentionality–whether the Commission’s information policy is designed to undermine the 
32 
33 formation of an EPS. Rather, the point is that by confining analysis to official proclamations 
34 
35 
we are unable to account for the antipublic and antipolitical ideas that are encoded in the 
37 
38 Commission’s information policy. Third, these findings challenge the (crypto)normative 
39 
40 assumptions underpinning much contemporary theorisation of the EPS where a more ‘proactive 
41 
42 
media policy and public relations strategy’ (Desmet et al., 2015: 3192) is seen as key to solving 
43 
44 
45 the Commission’s alleged communication deficit. Instead, as I conclude below, the 
46 
47 historically-engrained ambivalence towards a European public sphere needs to be located in 
48 
49 the struggle over the expansion of post-democracy, in which the contestation over TTIP 
50 
51 
became a key frontline. 
53 
54 Indeed, as De Ville and Siles-Brügge (2016: 122) argue, the Commission’s 
55 
56 instrumentalisation of information policy ‘as a weapon to counter NGO ‘myths’ and ‘horror 
57 
58 
stories’ fundamentally misdiagnoses the problem at hand as one of ‘misinformation’ rather 
60 
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1 
2 
3 than of value-based opposition’ to the EU’s neoliberal trade agenda - a (mis)diagnosis that 
4 
5 
chimes rather uncomfortably with much contemporary theorisation of the EPS. However, as 
7 
8 the evidence presented earlier suggests, appeals to alternative normative principles on which 
9 
10 different visions of trade policy could be based do not register in any meaningful sense in 
11 
12 
policymakers’ internal deliberation. This becomes apparent when set against the Commission’s 
14 
15 efforts to ‘coordinate’ its communication strategy with ‘third-party endorsers’, which include 
16 
17 major corporate lobby groups such as BUSINESSEUROPE and singles out the influential 
18 
19 
Transatlantic Business Dialogue as a partner for ‘joint messages’ during the 2014 World 
20 
21 
22 Economic Forum. What follows is that the Commission cannot implement its discursive 
23 
24 commitment to deliberative democracy without endangering the ideological principles 
25 
26 underpinning the EU’s trade agenda. The depoliticising logic of technocracy finds its 
27 
28 
counterpart in the neoliberal colonisation of democracy, whereby the scope of what is 
30 
31 politically contestable is circumscribed by the overriding imperative to guarantee the 
32 
33 functioning of ‘free’ markets and ‘free’ trade. 
34 
35 
A key implication for theorising the EPS is thus the need to take seriously the extent to 
37 
38 which post-democracy has diminished the function of public spheres as communicative spaces 
39 
40 that tie the exercise of political power to public opinion formation. But, contrary to Fenton and 
41 
42 
Titley (2015), I suggest that it may be too early to abandon the public sphere from the 
43 
44 
45 conceptual arsenal of critical theory. Post-democratisation is a contested and unevenly 
46 
47 distributed process (Crouch, 2016), as mobilisation against TTIP has shown, and political 
48 
49 power ‘by definition requires legitimation’ (Habermas, 2006:418), even in the quintessentially 
50 
51 
technocratic arena of trade policy. Indeed, as Chomsky observed some three decades ago: 
53 
54 
55 
56 State capitalist democracy has a certain tension with regard to the locus of power: in 
57 
58 
principle, the people rule, but effective power resides largely in private hands…One 
60 
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6 
13 
1 
2 
3 way to reduce the tension is to remove the public from the scene, except in form (1991: 
4 
5 
375) 
7 
8 
9 
10 The Commission’s information policy is precisely an articulation of this tension: torn between 
11 
12 
the depoliticising logic of technocratic and neoliberal rationality on one hand and the 
14 
15 legitimating demands of liberal and deliberative democracy on the other, such that ‘public 
16 
17 opinion’ becomes simultaneously invoked and excluded. This paper has shown that the spectre 
18 
19 
of the public is very real in the everyday deliberations of Commission officials. Yet, as long as 
20 
21 
22 their primary role is to sustain the existing global trade architecture and the private interests it 
23 
24 serves, citizens’ demands for alternative, more democratic, imaginaries of public-political 
25 
26 participation cannot be satisfied through information policy reforms alone. 
27 
28 
29 
30 
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32 
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